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Abstract
We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple tech-
nology. Efficiency and time consistency are characterized by stationary consumption
and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, we con-
sider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton, and resource monotonicity. We
show that Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton imply that the consumption and inheri-
tance functions are monotone with respect to time—thus justifying sustainability—
while resource monotonicity implies that the consumption and inheritance functions
are monotone with respect to the resource. Examples illustrate the characterization
results.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D63, D71.
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1 Introduction
The literature on ranking infinite consumption (or utility) streams has produced a num-
ber of negative results in the form of the incompatibility of seemingly mild axioms. For
example, following Koopmans (1960), Diamond (1965) establishes that anonymity is in-
compatible with the strong Pareto principle. Finite anonymity weakens anonymity by
restricting the application of the standard anonymity requirement to situations where
utility streams differ in at most a finite number of components. Diamond (1965) goes on
to show that strong Pareto, finite anonymity and a continuity requirement are incompati-
ble if the social relation is required to be transitive and complete. Instead of requiring the
Sidgwickean principle of finite anonymity, Hara, Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu (2008)
focus on two principles of distributional egalitarianism along the line of the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle and the Lorenz domination principle, and show that there exists no
social evaluation relation satisfying one of these egalitarian principles and a weakened
continuity condition even in the absence of the Pareto principle and completeness. Basu
and Mitra (2003) show that strong Pareto, finite anonymity and representability by a
real-valued function are incompatible. Epstein (1986) establishes the incompatibility of
a set of standard axioms and a substitution property requiring the possibility to improve
upon any given constant stream by means of a stream with lower initial consumption.
The main purpose of this paper is to explore an alternative approach that may provide
a promising way to address issues involving intergenerational allocation problems with an
infinite horizon. Instead of searching for a ranking of infinite streams, we examine a
choice-theoretic model where a choice function is used to select a consumption stream
from each set of feasible streams. Because our focus is on the choice-theoretic aspect
of the model, we deliberately consider a simple setting where there is a single resource
and a stationary technology. This implies that the feasibility of a consumption stream is
determined by the initial amount of the resource available, and the choice function assigns
a consumption stream (the chosen consumption stream, given the feasibility constraint)
to each possible initial amount.
We begin with an analysis of two fundamental properties whose versions formulated
for orderings have been used extensively in the literature, namely, efficiency and time
consistency. We provide characterizations of all infinite-horizon choice functions satis-
fying either of the two axioms and, moreover, identify all choice functions with both
properties. We then consider equity properties that are choice-theoretic versions of the
Suppes-Sen principle, the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and resource monotonicity (see
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Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden, 2007; Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura, 2007; Hara,
Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu, 2008, for equity properties imposed on rankings of infinite
streams). Again, classes of infinite-horizon choice functions possessing one of these prop-
erties are characterized, and further axiomatizations are obtained by adding efficiency or
time consistency.
The results we obtain are promising. Unlike in the case of orderings of infinite utility
streams, impossibilities can be avoided and rich classes of infinite-horizon choice functions
satisfying several desirable properties do exist. In particular, our choice-theoretic version
of the Suppes-Sen principle imposes full anonymity rather than merely finite anonymity
and our choice functions may be continuous in the initial endowment. Moreover, it turns
out that the notion of sustainability, which has played a major role in the literature
on intergenerational resource allocation, is closely linked to the Suppes-Sen and Pigou-
Dalton principles. Our conclusion from these results is that the choice-theoretic approach
to intergenerational resource allocation provides an interesting and viable alternative to
the models based on establishing orderings of infinite utility streams, and we propose to
explore this approach further.1
It is true that optimal growth theory also studies choice functions under the name of
optimal policy functions in the infinite-horizon setting, but it derives choice functions from
specified quasi-orderings such as the catching up principle over the set of infinite utility
streams by looking at maximal elements from the set of feasible alternatives. In contrast,
our approach considers a choice-theoretic setting which does not postulate any specific
optimality criterion. Instead, we propose several axioms to be satisfied by choice functions
and characterize their implications, thereby encompassing different choice functions which
1One of the referees of this journal points out that some of the impossibilities in the literature on rank-
ing infinite utility streams arise from requiring a complete ordering, or even a numerical representability
of such an ordering, or from postulating certain continuity conditions on the ranking. It is asserted that
these impossibility theorems are not negative results, as they provide a justification for focusing on social
welfare quasi-orderings as a basic object of study with intertemporal social choice. This is a valuable and
largely agreeable observation, but two remarks seem to be in order here. In the first place, to find an
escape route from impossibility theorems by weakening the requirements on social welfare orderings is
also relevant in the context of Arrovian impossibility theorems. However, in order to secure meaningful
possibility theorems in this context, we may have to go beyond quasi-orderings and weaken transitivity as
well as completeness of social evaluation relations. For a recent vindication of this fact, see Bossert and
Suzumura (2008a). In the second place, a recent study by Hara, Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu (2008)
shows that impossibility theorems persist in the context of evaluating infinite utility streams if only we
retain weak vestiges of continuity, even when we dispose of completeness and coherence requirements on
social evaluation relations altogether.
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may or may not be generated by a variety of optimality criteria.
Section 2 contains some basic definitions and a first well-known observation charac-
terizing sets of feasible consumption streams. In Section 3, we examine the fundamental
axioms of efficiency and time consistency. We characterize all efficient infinite-horizon
choice functions, all time-consistent infinite-horizon choice functions, and the class of
infinite-horizon choice functions satisfying both requirements. Section 4 deals with the
equity axioms a` la Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton and resource monotonicity. We charac-
terize all infinite-horizon choice functions satisfying: (i) Suppes-Sen; (ii) efficiency and
Pigou-Dalton; (iii) time consistency and Suppes-Sen; (iv) efficiency, time consistency and
Pigou-Dalton; (v) efficiency, time consistency and resource monotonicity. As a by-product
of our analysis, we show that the conjunction of efficiency and Pigou-Dalton is equivalent
to Suppes-Sen. Section 5 provides some examples and Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let R+ and R++ denote the set of all non-negative real numbers and the set of all positive
real numbers, respectively. Analogously, Z+ and Z++ denote the set of all non-negative
integers and the set of all positive integers, respectively.
Define the set Y = RZ++ to be the set of all sequences y = (y0, y1, . . . , yt, . . .). We
interpret y as a consumption stream, where yt is the amount of a single resource consumed
in period t ∈ Z+. Time is measured relative to the present: period t is the tth period after
today. We use the following notation for inequalities in Y. For all y, z ∈ Y, y ≥ z if and
only if yt ≥ zt for all t ∈ Z+, and y > z if and only if y ≥ z and y 6= z.
The initial amount of the resource is x ∈ R+. We assume a stationary technology. For
x ∈ R+ and y ∈ Y, the sequence of resource stocks
X(x, y) = (X0(x, y), X1(x, y), . . . , Xt(x, y), . . .) ∈ RZ++
generated by x and y is x-feasible if y0 ≤ X0(x, y) = x and
yt ≤ Xt(x, y) = f(Xt−1(x, y)− yt−1)
for all t ∈ Z++, where the gross output function f is assumed to satisfy
f(0) = 0 , f is increasing, differentiable and concave on R+ , (F1)
r := infk≥0f ′(k)− 1 > 0 . (F2)
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Clearly, the case in which f(k) = k(1 + r) for all k ∈ R+ (with r > 0) is a special case of
a gross output function satisfying (F1) and (F2).2
For x ∈ R+, the set of x-feasible consumption streams is
S(x) = {y ∈ Y | X(x, y) is x-feasible }.
Associated with any x-feasible consumption stream y, there is a sequence of shadow prices
P (x, y) = (P0(x, y), P1(x, y), . . . , Pt(x, y), . . .) ∈ RZ+++
defined by P0(x, y) = 1 and
Pt(x, y) =
Pt−1(x, y)
f ′(Xt−1(x, y)− yt−1)
for all t ∈ Z++. In the case in which f(k) = k(1 + r), we have that Pt(x, y) = 1/(1 + r)t.
As shown by Mitra (1979, Lemma 2) and stated in the following lemma, any x-feasible
consumption stream has finite value under (F1) and (F2).
Lemma 1 For all x ∈ R+ and for all y ∈ S(x),
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, y)yt <∞ .
If f(k) = k(1 + r), then S(x) = {y ∈ Y |
∑∞
t=0Pt(x, y)yt ≤ x}, as observed by, e.g.,
McFadden (1967, p. 40) and Epstein (1986).
3 Efficient and time-consistent choice
An infinite-horizon choice function is a mapping C : R+ → Y such that C(x) ∈ S(x) for
all x ∈ R+. This function assigns a consumption stream to any given initial amount of
a single resource available in the economy. Note that consumption streams are undated:
whether the choice takes place today or tomorrow makes no difference if the same initial
endowment is present. This time-independence feature of a choice function ensures that
the choice of a starting period is irrelevant. For all t ∈ Z+, we write Ct(x) for the tth
component of the sequence C(x).
2Our original analysis was based on linear gross output functions. We owe thanks to a referee of this
journal for the suggestion to adopt the more general class of gross output functions characterized by (F1)
and (F2).
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The first fundamental property of an infinite-horizon choice function is the familiar
efficiency axiom. It requires that no x-feasible consumption stream Pareto dominates the
chosen consumption stream with initial stock x.
Efficiency. For all x ∈ R+ and for all y ∈ Y,
y > C(x) ⇒ y 6∈ S(x).
Given Lemma 1, a corollary to the theorem of Cass and Yaari (1971, pp. 337–338)
implies that the class of efficient choice functions can be characterized as follows.
Lemma 2 An infinite-horizon choice function C satisfies efficiency if and only if
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))Ct(x) ≥
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))yt for all x ∈ R+ and for all y ∈ S(x). (C1)
Time consistency prevents deviations from chosen consumption streams as time pro-
gresses. Thus, for any x ∈ R+ and for any t, τ ∈ Z+, the consumption Ct+τ (x) in period
t+ τ for the initial endowment x should be the same as the consumption Cτ (Xt(x, C(x)))
in period τ for the initial endowment Xt(x, C(x)).
Time consistency. For all x ∈ R+ and for all t, τ ∈ Z+,
Ct+τ (x) = Cτ (Xt(x, C(x))).
We now characterize all infinite-horizon choice functions satisfying time consistency.
In order to express this class of choice functions, we use a function g : R+ → R+ that
indicates, for each initial level of the resource, the amount of the resource that is available
in the next period after the present consumption has taken place. Hence, we may refer
to g as the inheritance function.
For any function g : R+ → R+, let the function g0 : R+ → R+ be defined by g0(x) =
x for all x ∈ R+ and, for all t ∈ Z++, define the function gt : R+ → R+ by letting
gt(x) = g(gt−1(x)) for all x ∈ R+. As will become clear once our characterization of time
consistency is stated, the functions gt have a natural interpretation: they identify the
amount of the resource available in period t as a function of the initial endowment x only.
Because all these functions are determined once a function g is chosen, it is sufficient to
specify, for any initial endowment, the amount of the resource remaining at the beginning
of period one.
The following lemma characterizes all time-consistent choice functions.
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Lemma 3 An infinite-horizon choice function C satisfies time consistency if and only if
there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that
g(x) ≤ f(x) for all x ∈ R+ (G1)
and
gt+1(x) = f(gt(x)− Ct(x)) for all t ∈ Z+ and for all x ∈ R+ . (CG)
Proof. ‘If.’ Let C be an infinite-horizon choice function and suppose there exists a
function g : R+ → R+ such that (G1) and (CG) are satisfied. Let x ∈ R+ and t ∈ Z+. By
(G1), it follows that
gt+1(x) = g(gt(x)) ≤ f(gt(x))
and, together with (F1) and (CG), that
0 ≤ Ct(x) ≤ gt(x) .
Using (CG) and the definition of X, this observation entails that X(x, C(x)) is an x-
feasible sequence of resource stocks satisfying
Xt(x, C(x)) = gt(x) for all t ∈ Z+ . (1)
Hence, C(x) ∈ S(x), and C is a well-defined infinite-horizon choice function.
To establish time consistency, let x ∈ R+ and t, τ ∈ Z+. By (CG),
f(gτ(gt(x))− Cτ (gt(x))) = gτ+1(gt(x)) = gt+τ+1(x) = f(gt+τ (x)− Ct+τ (x)) ,
which, together with (F1) and (1), proves that C is time consistent.
‘Only if.’ Suppose C is an infinite-horizon choice function that satisfies time consis-
tency. Define the function g : R+ → R+ by letting
g(x) = f(x− C0(x)) (2)
for all x ∈ R+. By feasibility, C0(x) ∈ [0, x], and the definition of g immediately implies
g(x) ∈ [0, f(x)] for all x ∈ R+, establishing that g indeed maps into R+ and that (G1) is
satisfied.
It remains to be shown that (CG) is satisfied. We proceed by induction. Suppose
gt+1(x) = f(gt(x)− Ct(x)) (3)
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for some t ∈ Z+. Since, by definition, g(x) = f(x−C0(x)) = X1(x, C(x)), and C satisfies
time consistency, it follows that Ct(g(x)) = Ct(X1(x, C(x))) = Ct+1(x). Thus, using (3),
we obtain
gt+2(x) = gt+1(g(x)) = f(gt(g(x))− Ct(g(x))) = f(gt+1(x)− Ct+1(x)) ,
which combined with (2) completes the proof.
If (G1) is satisfied, then g determines a bequest function f−1 ◦ g : R+ → R+. For
each initial level of the resource, f−1(g(x)) ∈ [0, x] is the bequest that is left behind, and
x− f−1(g(x)) is the present consumption.
We now characterize all infinite-horizon choice functions satisfying both efficiency and
time consistency.
Theorem 1 An infinite-horizon choice function C satisfies efficiency and time consis-
tency if and only if there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that (G1), (CG) and
lim
t→∞
Pt(x, C(x))gt(x) = 0 for all x ∈ R+ (G2)
are satisfied.
Proof. ‘If.’ Let C be an infinite-horizon choice function and suppose there exists a
function g : R+ → R+ such that (G1), (CG) and (G2) are satisfied. Then, by Lemma
3, C is a well-defined infinite-horizon choice function that satisfies time consistency. Let
y ∈ S(x). By (F1) and the definition of P , it holds for all t ∈ Z++ that
gt(x)−Xt(x, y) = f(gt−1(x)− Ct−1(x))− f(Xt−1(x, y)− yt−1)
≥ f ′(gt−1(x)− Ct−1(x))
(
(gt−1(x)− Ct−1(x))− (Xt−1(x, y)− yt−1)
)
=
Pt−1(x, C(x))
Pt(x, C(x))
(
(gt−1(x)− Ct−1(x))− (Xt−1(x, y)− yt−1)
)
,
which can be rewritten as
Pt−1(x, C(x))(Ct−1(x)− yt−1)
≥ Pt(x, C(x))(Xt(x, y)− gt(x))− Pt−1(x, C(x))(Xt−1(x, y)− gt−1(x)) .
Hence, since g0(x) = x = X0(x, y),
τ−1∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))(Ct(x)− yt) ≥ Pτ (x, C(x))(Xτ (x, y)− gτ(x)) .
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By invoking Lemma 2, this, combined with (G2), implies that C satisfies efficiency, since
P (x, C(x)) ∈ RZ+++ and X(x, y) ∈ R
Z+
+ .
‘Only if.’ (This proof builds on Mitra, 1979, Theorem 2.) Suppose C is an infinite-
horizon choice function that satisfies efficiency and time consistency. Then, by Lemma
3, there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that (G1) and (CG) are satisfied. Suppose
g does not satisfy (G2); i.e., there exists a subsequence of periods, and m > 0, such
that Pt(x, C(x))gt(x) ≥ m for this subsequence. By Lemma 1, we can choose τ ′ such that∑∞
t=τ ′ Pt(x, C(x))Ct(x) ≤ 12m. Choose τ ≥ τ
′ such that Pτ (x, C(x))gτ(x) ≥ m, and define
y ∈ Y as follows: yt = Ct(x) for 0 ≤ t < τ , yτ = gτ (x), and yt = 0 for t > τ . Clearly,
y ∈ S(x) with
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))yt ≥
τ−1∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))yt +m ≥
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))Ct(x) + 12m .
By Lemma 2, this contradicts that C satisfies efficiency. Hence, g satisfies (G2).
Condition (G2) is of course a capital value transversality condition, which has been
used to characterize efficient capital accumulation at least since Malinvaud (1953).
The properties (G1) and (G2) of a function g : R+ → R+ are independent, as is
straightforward to verify. That (CG) must be satisfied is a consequence of the time-
consistency requirement, and (G1) ensures that this is done without violating the resource
constraints. Property (G2) is required for the efficiency axiom.
4 Imposing equity axioms
We now examine the consequences of imposing certain equity axioms, in addition to
efficiency and time consistency.
The first of the equity axioms that we consider—Suppes-Sen—requires that no x-
feasible consumption stream has a permutation which Pareto dominates the chosen con-
sumption stream with initial stock x. The term ‘permutation’ signifies a bijective mapping
pi of Z+ onto itself. The Suppes-Sen axiom is a straightforward adaptation of the Suppes-
Sen principle for orderings (cf. Suppes, 1966; Sen, 1970) to the present infinite-horizon
choice-theoretic setting.
Suppes-Sen. For all x ∈ R+ and for all y, y′ ∈ Y, if y′ is a permutation of y, then
y′ > C(x) ⇒ y 6∈ S(x).
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Clearly, the Suppes-Sen axiom implies efficiency. Note that we do not restrict the scope
of the axiom to finite permutations (that is, permutations pi with the property that there is
a t ∈ Z+ such that pi(τ) = τ for all τ ≥ t). In contrast to the Suppes-Sen axiom formulated
for orderings of infinite utility streams, allowing for infinite permutations does not lead
to an impossibility in the choice-theoretic setting, given our technological environment.
This is established by combining our next result, which characterizes all choice functions
satisfying the Suppes-Sen principle, with the fact that, for any initial resource stock, there
exists a non-empty set of efficient and non-decreasing streams.
Lemma 4 An infinite-horizon choice function C satisfies Suppes-Sen if and only if (C1)
and
Ct(x) ≤ Ct+1(x) for all x ∈ R+ and for all t ∈ Z+ (C2)
are satisfied.
Proof. ‘If.’ Assume (C1) and (C2) are satisfied. Let y′ be a permutation pi of y, and
suppose y′ > C(x). Denote by y′′ the permutation pi−1 of C(x). Then
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))y′′t ≥
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))Ct(x) ,
since the sequence 〈Pt(x, C(x))〉t∈Z+ is decreasing by virtue of (F1) and (F2), and the
sequence 〈Ct(x)〉t∈Z+ is non-decreasing. By construction, y > y′′; hence,
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))yt >
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))Ct(x) .
By (C1), y 6∈ S(x). Thus, C satisfies Suppes-Sen.
‘Only if.’ Suppose that C satisfies Suppes-Sen. Let x ∈ R+. By way of contradiction,
suppose first that there exists y′ ∈ S(x) such that
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))Ct(x) <
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))y′t .
Then by Lemma 2, there exists y ∈ S(x) such that y > C(x). Thus, there is an x-feasible
consumption stream which Pareto-dominates the chosen consumption stream with initial
stock x, entailing that C does not satisfy Suppes-Sen. Hence, (C1) must be satisfied.
By way of contradiction, suppose that (C2) is not satisfied, i.e., there exists τ ∈ Z+
such that Cτ (x) > Cτ+1(x). Construct y ∈ Y as follows:
yt =



Ct(x) if t 6∈ {τ, τ + 1},
Cτ+1(x) if t = τ,
Cτ+1(x) + f(Xτ (x, C(x))− Cτ+1(x))− f(Xτ (x, C(x))− Cτ (x)) if t = τ + 1.
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Then Xτ+1(x, y)− yτ+1 = f(Xτ (x, y)− yτ )− yτ+1 = f(Xτ (x, C(x))− Cτ+1(x))− yτ+1 =
f(Xτ (x, C(x))−Cτ (x))−Cτ+1(x) = Xτ+1(x, C(x))−Cτ+1(x), where the second equality
follows from the definition of yτ and the third equality follows from the definition of yτ+1.
This entails that Xt(x, y) = Xt(x, C(x)) for all t 6= τ + 1, and implies that y ∈ S(x).
Construct y′ ∈ Y from y by permuting yτ and yτ+1. It follows that y′τ = yτ+1 > Cτ (x)
since, by (F2), f(k + ε) > f(k) + ε whenever ε > 0, while y′t = Ct(x) holds otherwise;
hence, we have that y′ > C(x). Thus, there is an x-feasible consumption stream with a
permutation which Pareto-dominates the chosen consumption stream with initial stock
x, entailing that C does not satisfy Suppes-Sen. Hence, (C2) must be satisfied.
Note that the necessity of (C2) requires only that f(k+ ε) > f(k)+ ε whenever ε > 0.
Hence, since the Suppes-Sen axiom implies efficiency, the statement “An infinite-horizon
choice function C satisfies Suppes-Sen only if efficiency and (C2) are satisfied” remains
true even if (F2) is weakened to
f ′(k) > 1 for all k ∈ R+ . (F2′)
The converse statement, “An infinite-horizon choice function C satisfies Suppes-Sen if
efficiency and (C2) are satisfied”, also remains true even if (F2) is weakened to (F2′), as
shown by the following argument. Assume that efficiency and (C2) are satisfied. Let y′
be a permutation pi of y, and suppose y′ > C(x). Denote by y′′ the permutation pi−1 of
C(x). Then
lim infT→∞
T∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x)) (y′′t − Ct(x)) ≥ 0 ,
since the sequence 〈Pt(x, C(x))〉t∈Z+ is decreasing by virtue of (F1) and (F2), and the
sequence 〈Ct(x)〉t∈Z+ is non-decreasing. By construction, y > y′′; hence,
lim infT→∞
T∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x)) (yt − Ct(x)) > 0 .
By the theorem of Cass and Yaari (1971, p. 337), y 6∈ S(x). Thus, C satisfies Suppes-Sen.
As is apparent from the proof of Lemma 4, the Suppes-Sen principle as stated in
the lemma can be replaced with its finite counterpart, restricting its conclusion to finite
permutations. In our setting, the two properties are equivalent and we chose to use the
general version in order to illustrate that, unlike the model based on orderings of infinite
streams, our approach does not lead to an impossibility when infinite permutations are
permitted.
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The observation that the Suppes-Sen axiom can allow for infinite permutations with-
out leading to an impossibility in the choice-theoretic setting is robust with respect to
modifications in our technological assumptions. To see this, consider the technological
assumptions of immediate productivity and eventual productivity, as defined by Asheim,
Buchholz and Tungodden (2001, p. 259). The assumption of immediate productivity
states that if y ∈ Y with yτ > yτ+1 for some τ ∈ Z+ is feasible, then y′ ∈ Y constructed
by
y′t =



yt if t 6∈ {τ, τ + 1},
yτ+1 if t = τ,
yτ if t = τ + 1
is feasible and inefficient. The assumption of eventual productivity states that, for any
initial resource stock(s) and time, there exists an efficient and equally-distributed stream.
The class of technologies that satisfy the assumptions of immediate productivity and even-
tual productivity includes the simple stationary technologies that we consider throughout
this paper. However, the former class of technologies is wider than the latter class, as
illustrated by Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden (2001, Examples 1–3).
In a technology satisfying eventual productivity, the choice function assigning to any
initial resource stock(s) and time the efficient and equally-distributed stream is an efficient,
time consistent choice function satisfying even the infinite permutation Suppes-Sen axiom.
Hence, provided that the assumption of eventual productivity is satisfied, the Suppes-Sen
axiom can allow for infinite permutations without leading to an impossibility in the choice-
theoretic setting. If we add immediate productivity, we obtain a generalization of Lemma
4: An infinite-horizon choice function satisfies Suppes-Sen if and only if, for any initial
resource stock(s) and time, the chosen stream is efficient and non-decreasing. Also the
latter result allows for the version of Suppes-Sen axiom that includes infinite permutations,
although it continues to hold if the axiom is replaced by its finite permutation counterpart.
The second of the equity axioms—Pigou-Dalton—requires that no x-feasible consump-
tion stream can be generated from the chosen consumption stream with initial stock x
through a transfer of consumption from a better-off to a worse-off generation. The axiom
is a straightforward adaptation of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (cf. Pigou, 1912;
Dalton, 1920) for social welfare orderings to the present choice-theoretic setting.
Pigou-Dalton. For all x ∈ R+ and for all y, y′ ∈ Y, if there exist ε ∈ R++ and τ, τ ′ ∈ Z+
such that yτ = y′τ − ε ≥ y′τ ′ + ε = yτ ′ and yt = y′t for all t ∈ Z+\{τ, τ ′}, then
y′ = C(x) ⇒ y 6∈ S(x).
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Unlike the Suppes-Sen principle, Pigou-Dalton does not imply efficiency. However,
it rules out all violations of efficiency that do not involve equally-distributed streams.
As will become clear in the proof of the following theorem, efficiency could therefore be
replaced with a weaker axiom that applies to equal distributions only. We chose to keep
the standard efficiency axiom for clarity and ease of exposition.
We now characterize all infinite-horizon choice functions satisfying efficiency and the
Pigou-Dalton principle. Interestingly, this is the same class as the one identified in the
previous lemma.
Lemma 5 An infinite-horizon choice function C satisfies efficiency and Pigou-Dalton if
and only if (C1) and (C2) are satisfied.
Proof. ‘If.’ Assume (C1) and (C2) are satisfied. By Lemma 2, C satisfies efficiency.
Since the sequence 〈Pt(x, C(x))〉t∈Z+ is decreasing and the sequence 〈Ct(x)〉t∈Z+ is non-
decreasing, if yτ = Cτ (x)− ε ≥ Cτ ′(x) + ε = yτ ′ for some ε ∈ R++ and yt = Ct(x) for all
t ∈ Z+ \ {τ, τ ′}, then
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))yt >
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))Ct(x) .
By (C1), y 6∈ S(x). Thus, C satisfies Pigou-Dalton.
‘Only if.’ Suppose that C satisfies efficiency and Pigou-Dalton. Let x ∈ R+. By way
of contradiction, suppose first that there exists y′ ∈ S(x) such that
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))Ct(x) <
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))y′t .
This, by Lemma 2, contradicts the efficiency of C. Hence, (C1) must be satisfied.
By way of contradiction, suppose that (C2) is not satisfied, i.e., there exists τ ∈ Z+
such that Cτ (x) > Cτ+1(x). Construct y ∈ Y as follows:
yt =



Ct(x) if t 6∈ {τ, τ + 1},
Cτ (x)− ε if t = τ,
Cτ+1(x) + ε if t = τ + 1,
where 0 < ε ≤ (Cτ (x)− Cτ+1(x))/2, so that yτ = Cτ (x)− ε ≥ Cτ+1(x) + ε = yτ+1. Then
Xτ+1(x, y)− yτ+1 = f(Xτ(x, y)− yτ )− yτ+1
= f(Xτ(x, C(x))− Cτ (x) + ε)− Cτ+1(x)− ε
> f(Xτ(x, C(x))− Cτ (x))− Cτ+1(x) = Xτ+1(x, C(x))− Cτ+1(x)
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since, by (F2), f(k+ε) > f(k)+εwhenever ε > 0. This entails thatXt(x, y) = Xt(x, C(x))
for all t < τ + 1 and, by (F1), Xt(x, y) > Xt(x, C(x)) for all t ≥ τ + 1, and implies that
y ∈ S(x). Thus, an x-feasible consumption stream can be generated from the chosen
consumption stream with initial stock x through a transfer of consumption from a better-
off to a worse-off generation, entailing that C does not satisfy Pigou-Dalton. Hence, (C2)
must be satisfied.
A similar remark as the one made subsequent to Lemma 4 applies to Lemma 5. Hence,
the statement “An efficient infinite horizon choice function C satisfies Pigou-Dalton if and
only if (C2) is satisfied” remains true even if (F2) is weakened to (F2′).
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of the previous two lemmas.
Corollary 1 An infinite-horizon choice function C satisfies Suppes-Sen if and only if C
satisfies efficiency and Pigou-Dalton.
The following theorem identifies all choice functions satisfying time consistency in
addition to Suppes-Sen (or, equivalently, in addition to efficiency and Pigou-Dalton).
Theorem 2 An infinite-horizon choice function C satisfies time consistency and Suppes-
Sen (or efficiency, time consistency and Pigou-Dalton) if and only if there exists a function
g : R+ → R+ such that (G1), (CG), (G2),
x ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ R+ (G3)
and
x− f−1(g(x)) ≤ g(x)− f−1(g(g(x))) for all x ∈ R+ (G4)
are satisfied.
Proof. ‘If.’ Suppose there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that (G1), (CG), (G2),
(G3) and (G4) are satisfied. By Theorem 1, C satisfies efficiency and time consistency.
Thus, by Lemma 2, (C1) is satisfied. By (CG) and (G4),
Ct(x) = gt(x)− f−1(gt+1(x))
≤ g(gt(x))− f−1(g(gt+1(x))) = gt+1(x)− f−1(gt+2(x)) = Ct+1(x)
for all x ∈ R+ and for all t ∈ Z+. Hence, by Lemma 4, C satisfies Suppes-Sen.
‘Only if.’ Assume that C satisfies time consistency and Suppes-Sen. By Lemma 4,
(C1) and (C2) are satisfied and, by Lemma 2, C satisfies efficiency. By Theorem 1, there
exists a function g : R+ → R+ satisfying (G1), (CG) and (G2).
13
To show (G3), suppose there exists x ∈ R+ such that x > g(x). By (C2),
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))Ct(x) ≤
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))Ct+1(x) . (4)
Construct y ∈ S(x) by y0 satisfying g(g(x)) = f(x− y0) and yt = Ct+1(x) for all t ∈ Z++.
Since x > g(x) and, by (CG), f(x− y0) = g(g(x)) = f(g(x)−C1(x)), it follows from (F1)
that y0 > C1(x). Hence,
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))Ct+1(x) <
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x, C(x))yt . (5)
However, (4) and (5) combined with y ∈ S(x) contradict (C1).
To show (G4), suppose there exists x ∈ R+ such that
x− f−1(g(x)) > g(x)− f−1(g(g(x))).
By (CG),
C0(x) = x− f−1(g(x)) > g(x)− f−1(g(g(x))) = g(x)− f−1(g2(x)) = C1(x) ,
contradicting (C2).
Condition (G3) ensures sustainable development in the sense that the current con-
sumption can potentially be shared by all future generations. In the context of a station-
ary technology with only one resource (or capital good), this requires that the resource
stock is maintained from the current period to the next, which is just what condition
(G3) entails. Condition (G4) complements (G3) by requiring that the potential for shar-
ing present consumption with future generations actually materializes. Hence, Theorem
2 means that both the Suppes-Sen axiom and the Pigou-Dalton axiom can be used to
justify sustainability in the present choice-theoretic setting.
Theorem 2 thereby echoes similar results when infinite-horizon social choice is analyzed
through social welfare relations.
• In particular, Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden (2001) show how the Suppes-Sen
principle for social welfare relations can be used to rule out unsustainable con-
sumption streams as maximal elements under technological conditions satisfied by
the simple model considered here. Given such technological assumptions, this re-
sult also implies that social welfare relations like those considered in Asheim and
Tungodden (2004), Basu and Mitra (2007), and Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura
(2007), which all satisfy the Suppes-Sen principle, yield sustainable consumption
streams as maximal elements as long as maximal elements exist.
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• Asheim (1991) shows in a similar way how the Pigou-Dalton principle for social
welfare relations can be used to rule out unsustainable consumption streams.
Another equity axiom that appears to be natural in this context is resource monotonic-
ity. It requires that no one should be worse off as a consequence of an increase in the
initial level of the resource. See Thomson (2008) for a discussion of resource monotonicity
in a variety of economic models and further references. Formulated for infinite-horizon
choice functions, the axiom is defined as follows.
Resource monotonicity. For all x, x′ ∈ R+,
x > x′ ⇒ C(x) ≥ C(x′).
Adding resource monotonicity to efficiency and time consistency leads to the choice
functions characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 An infinite-horizon choice function C satisfies efficiency, time consistency
and resource monotonicity if and only if there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that
(G1), (CG), (G2),
g is non-decreasing in x (G5)
and
x 7→ x− f−1(g(x)) is non-decreasing in x (G6)
are satisfied.
Proof. ‘If.’ Assume that there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that (G1), (CG), (G2),
(G5) and (G6) are satisfied. By Theorem 1, C satisfies efficiency and time consistency.
Let x > x′. By (G5), we have that
gt(x) ≥ gt(x′)
for all t ∈ Z+. Consequently, by (CG) and (G6),
Ct(x) = gt(x)− f−1(gt+1(x)) = gt(x)− f−1(g(gt(x)))
≥ gt(x′)− f−1(g(gt(x′))) = gt(x′)− f−1(gt+1(x′)) = Ct(x′)
for all t ∈ Z+. Hence, C satisfies resource monotonicity.
‘Only if.’ Assume that C satisfies efficiency, time consistency and resource monotonic-
ity. By Theorem 1, there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that (G1), (CG) and (G2)
are satisfied.
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To show (G5), suppose there exist x, x′ ∈ R+ such that x > x′, but g(x) < g(x′). By
x > x′ and resource monotonicity,
∞∑
t=1
Pt(x′, C(x′))Ct(x) ≥
∞∑
t=1
Pt(x′, C(x′))Ct(x′) . (6)
Construct y ∈ S(x′) by y0 satisfying g(x) = f(x′ − y0) and yt = Ct(x) for all t ∈ Z++.
Since, by (CG), f(x′ − y0) = g(x) < g(x′) = f(x′ − C0(x′)), it follows from (F1) that
y0 > C0(x′). Hence,
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x′, C(x′))yt >
∞∑
t=0
Pt(x′, C(x′))Ct(x′) . (7)
However, (6) and (7) combined with y ∈ S(x′) contradict (C1).
To show (G6), suppose there exist x, x′ ∈ R+ such that x > x′, but
x− f−1(g(x)) < x′ − f−1(g(x′)) .
By (CG),
C0(x) = x− f−1(g(x)) < x′ − f−1(g(x′)) = C0(x′) ,
contradicting resource monotonicity.
Note that the proof of (G5) relies on efficiency, whereas (G6) is established without
using this axiom.
It follows from Theorems 2 and 3 that the classes of choice functions characterized
in Theorem 1 can be narrowed down considerably by adding equity axioms. However,
Suppes-Sen or Pigou-Dalton, on the one hand, and resource monotonicity, on the other
hand, do so in different ways.
• By Theorem 2, Suppes-Sen or efficiency and Pigou-Dalton in combination with
time consistency imply that, for given x ∈ R+, gt(x) and gt(x) − f−1(gt+1(x)) are
monotone with respect to t, while
• by Theorem 3, resource monotonicity in combination with efficiency and time con-
sistency implies that gt(x) and gt(x) − f−1(gt+1(x)) are monotone with respect to
x for given t ∈ Z+.
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5 Examples
Consider first the steady-state example, where consumption is equalized across genera-
tions.
Example 1. The infinite-horizon choice function C1 of this example corresponds to the
case in which the function g is the identity mapping, defined by g(x) = x for all x ∈ R+.
This implies gt(x) = x for all x ∈ R+ and for all t ∈ Z+. (G1) and (G2) are satisfied
because
g(x) = x ≤ f(x)
and
lim
t→∞
Pt(x, C1(x))gt(x) = limt→∞
gt(x)∏t
τ=1[f ′(f−1(gτ(x)))]
= lim
t→∞
x
[f ′(f−1(x))]t = 0
for all x ∈ R+, where use is made of (F1) and (F2). According to (CG), C1t (x) satisfies
x = gt+1(x) = f(gt(x)− C1t (x)) = f(x− C1t (x)) (8)
for all x ∈ R+ and for all t ∈ Z+, that is, every generation consumes the same amount.
In addition to satisfying efficiency and time consistency, the infinite-horizon choice
function C1 is characterized by a g-function for which the conditions of (G3) and (G4)
hold with equality. By Theorem 2 this entails that C1 satisfies both Suppes-Sen and
Pigou-Dalton. Furthermore, both g(x) and x−f−1(g(x)) are non-decreasing in x. Hence,
by Theorem 3, the choice function satisfies resource monotonicity, as can easily be verified
directly from (8), by invoking (F2).
The remaining examples are formulated for a linear technology, i.e., f(k) = k(1 + r),
with r > 0. The renewal rate r is assumed to be positive to satisfy (F2) and ensure
that all choice functions are well-defined. It is possible to generalize these examples by
considering certain non-linear technologies but we restrict attention to the linear case for
the sake of simplicity of exposition. With f(k) = k(1 + r), we have that
(i) Pt(x, y) = 1/(1 + r)t for all t ∈ Z+, for all x ∈ R+ and for all y ∈ S(x), and
(ii) f−1(x) = x/(1 + r) for all x ∈ R+ so that (CG) can be written as
Ct(x) = gt(x)−
gt+1(x)
1 + r for all t ∈ Z+ and for all x ∈ R+ . (CG
′)
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In the case where the technology is linear, the choice function C1 of Example 1 can
be generalized by letting g be a linear function such that both g(x) and x− f−1(g(x)) =
x− (g(x)/(1+r)) are non-decreasing in x, so that resource monotonicity is satisfied. This
is investigated in the following example.
Example 2. The infinite-horizon choice function C2,a of this example is obtained by
letting g(x) = ax for all x ∈ R+, where a ∈ [0, 1 + r] is a parameter. Obviously, the
steady-state case is obtained for a = 1. It follows that gt(x) = atx for all x ∈ R+ and for
all t ∈ Z+. Clearly, (G1) is satisfied because
g(x) = ax ≤ x(1 + r)
for all x ∈ R+. (G2) is satisfied if and only if a < 1 + r, because
lim
t→∞
Pt(x, C2,a(x))gt(x) = limt→∞
atx
(1 + r)t
= lim
t→∞
( a
1 + r
)t
x = 0.
Hence, the case where a = 1 + r illustrates how (G2) can be violated by excessive accu-
mulation of the resource.
Substituting into (CG′), it follows that
C2,at (x) = gt(x)−
gt+1(x)
1 + r
= atx− a
t+1x
1 + r
=
at(1 + r − a)x
1 + r
(9)
for all x ∈ R+ and for all t ∈ Z+.
In addition to satisfying efficiency and time consistency for a < 1 + r, the infinite-
horizon choice function C2,a is characterized by a g-function for which the conditions of
(G3) and (G4) hold if and only if a ≥ 1. By Theorem 2 this entails that C2,a satisfies
efficiency, time consistency, Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton if and only if a ∈ [1, 1 + r). If
a ∈ (1, 1 + r), then consumption is increasing in t, and the consumption of generations t
such that
t > ln(r)− ln(1 + r − a)
ln(a)
is higher than that of the steady-state, at the expense of earlier generations. Moreover,
the consumption of generation t approaches infinity as t approaches infinity.
Both g(x) and x − (g(x)/(1 + r)) are non-decreasing in x for any a ∈ [0, 1 + r].
Hence, by Theorem 3, the choice function satisfies efficiency, time consistency and resource
monotonicity if and only if a ∈ [0, 1 + r), as can easily be verified directly from (9).
Therefore, C2,a satisfies resource monotonicity, but not Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton,
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if and only if a ∈ [0, 1). If a ∈ (0, 1), then consumption is decreasing in t, and the
consumption of generations t such that
t < ln(r)− ln(1 + r − a)
ln(a)
is higher than that of the steady-state, at the expense of later generations. Moreover, the
consumption of generation t approaches zero as t approaches infinity.
Example 2 shows, in the case where a < 1, that gt(x) and gt(x) − (gt+1(x)/(1 + r))
can be non-decreasing with respect to x, without gt(x) and gt(x)− (gt+1(x)/(1+r)) being
non-decreasing with respect to t. In particular, a choice function can satisfy resource
monotonicity without satisfying Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton. In the following pair
of examples, we show that a choice function can satisfy Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton
without satisfying resource monotonicity.
Example 3. The infinite-horizon choice function C3 of this example is obtained by setting
r = 1, so that 1 + r = 2, and by letting g be given by:
g(x) =



3
2x if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
4
3x if x > 1 .
Clearly, (G1) is satisfied. Also, x ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ R+ so that (G3) is satisfied, and
x − g(x)/2 is an increasing function of x so that (G6) is satisfied. By combining these
observations we obtain that x − g(x)/2 ≤ g(x) − g2(x)/2 for all x ∈ R+ so that (G4) is
satisfied. Furthermore, if x ∈ R++, then C3 behaves as C2,a with a ∈ (0, 1 + r) when t
goes to infinity, implying that (G2) is satisfied. If x = 0, then (G2) is trivially satisfied.
Hence, it follows from Theorem 2 that the infinite-horizon choice function C3 satisfies
efficiency, time consistency, Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton. However,
g(1) = 32 >
17
12 = g
(17
16
)
.
Hence, (G5) does not hold, and it follows from Theorem 3 that C3 does not satisfy resource
monotonicity.
Example 4. The infinite-horizon choice function C4 of this example is obtained by setting
r = 1, so that 1 + r = 2, and by letting g be given by:
g(x) =



4
3x if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
3
2x if x > 1.
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Clearly, (G1) is satisfied. Also, x ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ R+ so that (G3) is satisfied, and g(x)
is an increasing function of x so that (G5) is satisfied. Furthermore, if x ∈ R++, then C4
behaves as C2,a with a ∈ (0, 1+ r) when t goes to infinity, implying that (G2) is satisfied.
If x = 0, then (G2) is trivially satisfied. To verify that (G4) is satisfied, note that
x− g(x)2 =
(
1− 23
)
x = 13x ≤
4
9x =
(4
3 −
8
9
)
x = g(x)− g
2(x)
2 if 0 ≤ x ≤
3
4 ,
x− g(x)2 =
(
1− 23
)
x = 13x =
1
3x =
(4
3 − 1
)
x = g(x)− g
2(x)
2 if
4
3 < x ≤ 1,
x− g(x)2 =
(
1− 34
)
x = 14x ≤
3
8x =
(3
2 −
9
8
)
x = g(x)− g
2(x)
2 if x > 1.
Hence, it follows from Theorem 2 that the infinite-horizon choice function C4 satisfies
efficiency, time consistency, Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton. However,
1− g(1)2 = 1−
2
3 =
1
3 >
5
18 =
10
9 −
5
6 =
10
9 −
g(10/9)
2 .
Hence, (G6) does not hold, and it follows from Theorem 3 that C4 does not satisfy resource
monotonicity.
Examples 2, 3 and 4 show that the conditions characterizing Suppes-Sen and Pigou-
Dalton—namely that gt(x) and gt(x) − gt+1(x)/(1 + r) are monotone with respect to
t—are independent of the conditions characterizing resource monotonicity—namely that
gt(x) and gt(x)− gt+1(x)/(1 + r) are monotone with respect to x.
We conclude with an example showing that condition (G5) is not necessary for an
infinite-horizon choice function to satisfy time consistency and resource monotonicity, as
long as efficiency is not imposed.
Example 5. The infinite-horizon choice function C5 of this example is obtained by setting
r = 1, so that 1 + r = 2, and by letting g be given by:
g(x) =



2x if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
2(x− 12) if x > 1.
Clearly (G1) is satisfied, while condition (G5) is not satisfied, since
g(1) = 2 > 32 = g
(5
4
)
.
Resource monotonicity still holds since, by substituting into (CG′), it follows that
C5(x) =



(0, 0, . . . ) if x = 0,
(
0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1 times
, 12 ,
1
2 , . . .
)
if x ∈
(
(12)
n+1, (12)
n] for n ∈ Z+,
(1
2 ,
1
2 , . . .
)
if x > 1.
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It is straightforward to verify that C5 does not satisfy efficiency; in particular, increas-
ing the initial resource stock beyond x does not lead to increased consumption for any
generation, provided that x > 1.
Examples 1 and 2 provide infinite-horizon choice functions that are continuous in the
initial endowment, even though there are no continuous orderings satisfying strong Pareto
and finite anonymity that rationalize them. This observation serves to further underline
the gains that are possible from adopting a choice-theoretic approach.
6 Concluding remarks
We conclude this paper with some thoughts on possible directions where the approach of
this paper might be taken in future work. An issue that suggests itself naturally when
considering a choice function is its rationalizability by a relation defined on the objects of
choice—in our case, infinite consumption streams. The rationalizability of choice functions
with arbitrary domains has been examined thoroughly in contributions such as Richter
(1966) and Hansson (1968) and, more recently, Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005)
and Bossert and Suzumura (2008b). While the generality of the results obtained in these
papers allows for their application in our intergenerational setting, it might be possible to
obtain new observations due to the specific structure of the domain considered here. Note
that the existence of a rationalizing ordering does not conflict with the impossibility results
established for such orderings in the earlier literature: the existence of a rationalization
of an infinite-horizon choice function satisfying requirements such as Suppes-Sen does not
imply that the choice function is rationalizable by an ordering that possesses properties
such as the Suppes-Sen principle formulated for binary relations.
An interesting difference emerges when, in the linear case, the technology parameter
r is equal to zero instead of positive. For r = 0, Suppes-Sen and the conjunction of
efficiency and Pigou-Dalton no longer are equivalent—in fact, their implications are strik-
ingly different. In this case, the Pigou-Dalton principle rules out the choice of any unequal
stream. Thereby the principle becomes incompatible with efficiency because, for any fi-
nite initial endowment x, the only possible equitable choice is zero consumption in every
period, which clearly violates efficiency if x is positive. On the other hand, Suppes-Sen
reduces to efficiency because no stream that is not dominated according to the efficiency
criterion is dominated by a permutation of any feasible stream.
As mentioned earlier, we made the conscious choice to work with a simple model in
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order to emphasize the novel aspect of the paper—the choice-theoretic approach in an
infinite-horizon setting. It might turn out to be of interest to explore possible generaliza-
tions in future work.
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